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Abstract 
We revisit the question of whether analysts anticipate accruals’ predicted reversals 
(or persistence) of future earnings. Prior evidence shows that analysts are over 
optimistic with respect to working capital (WC) accruals which is interpreted as 
their inability to understand accruals’ persistence. Using total accruals (TACC) that 
in addition to WC accruals cover non-current operating and financing accruals, we 
show that analysts’ forecast errors are uncorrelated with accruals. We show that 
analysts’ optimism with respect to accruals is due to the use of an incomplete 
accrual measure, which does not necessarily indicate analysts’ lack of 
sophistication. Our results imply that traditional accrual definition should be revised 
in future studies. The main implication of our finding is that analysts seem to exhibit 
the necessary sophistication in understanding accruals persistence contrary to 
suggestions in prior research. Our findings are in line with the idea that any 
anomalous stock price behaviour related to accruals is not due to analysts’ forecasts, 
i.e., analysts' earnings forecasts and recommendations should not be considered as 
the originating source of stock price underreaction or overreaction with respect to 
accruals.  
Keywords: accrual persistence, analysts’ forecast errors, efficiency 
JEL Classification: M41, G10 
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1. Introduction  
We revisit the question of whether sell side security analysts anticipate the 
persistence of accruals in future earnings1. Revisiting this question is important, 
because prior research finds that accrual components of earnings are less persistent 
than cash flows and that investors fail to anticipate this property of earnings which 
results in getting negative returns from buying stock with high accruals (Sloan, 
1996). Prior evidence documents that analysts who provide information to investors 
fail to flag this accruals property (Bradshaw, et al., 2001) and that they are over 
optimistic about firms with high working capital (WC) accruals. This is generally 
interpreted as analysts’ lack of sophistication in understanding accruals persistence.  
A number of more recent studies (Fedyk et al., 2018; Barth et al., 2016) demonstrate 
that investors’ understanding of accruals has improved since Sloan (1996) and that 
investors no longer appear to naively fixate on earnings. Findings by Barth et al. 
(2016) reveal that investors can extract accrual information about future firm 
performance and that each type of accruals has different role in predicting future 
cash flows and earnings. Fedyk et al., (2018) suggest that investors gradually learn 
about accruals properties such as persistence and then correct their mispricing. 
Given the importance of analysts in capital markets as financial intermediaries, and 
increasing use of analysts’ reports by markets, we posit that investors’ learning 
about accrual types’ properties and the correction of accrual mispricing is likely to 
be channelled through a greater  use of analysts’ forecasts.. Hence, it is important 
to verify if inferences regarding analysts’ forecasts errors with respect to accruals 
from Bradshaw et al. (2001) correctly reflects the analysts’ abilities in this context. 
We directly investigate whether analysts understand accruals types and 
characteristics and how this understanding informs their forecasts of earnings. We 
ask whether analysts’ forecasts errors may be explained by analysts’ strategic 
behaviour or whether they may be due to accrual measures which have not been 
explicitly considered in Bradshaw et al. (2001)’s theory and empirical testing.  We 
build on prior research showing that analysts’ forecasts are superior compared to 
forecasts generated by various earnings expectation models and that analysts are 
strategic in their forecasts (Fried and Givoly, 1982; Francis and Philbrick, 1993), 
                                                          
1 Persistence refers to continuity from one period to another.  
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which is indicative of their high sophistication. Also, a growing evidence in the 
literature shows that the traditional accrual definition used in the empirical models 
of analysts’ forecast accuracy omits economically important accrual types that are 
highly relevant for explaining future earnings and returns (e.g., Richardson, Sloan, 
Soliman, and Tuna, 2005).  We argue that analysts are likely to use this important 
accrual information and that empirical models measuring accruals by means of 
working capital alone may be incomplete and hence not entirely appropriate and 
up-to-date to assess the level of analysts’ appreciation of accruals. In other words, 
we suggest that analysts’ optimism with respect to accruals found in Bradshaw et 
al. (2001) may not be due to their lack of sophistication, but rather a result of an 
incomplete accrual information embedded in forecast accuracy tests. In particular, 
by omitting non-current operating and financial accruals, analysts’ optimism may 
be a results of a mechanical relation inherent to the model specification in Bradshaw 
et al. (2001). Given that WC accruals are the least persistent accrual components 
which are associated with largest mispricing by investors (Richardson et al., 2005) 
it is perhaps not surprising that WC accruals are strongly associated with analysts’ 
forecasts errors, too (Bradshaw et al. 2001). Our study revises the definition of 
accruals used in forecasting models by giving consideration to non-current 
operating and financial accruals, and revisits the issue. This is an important aspect 
to revisit because analysts’ ability to unravel, understand and predict different 
properties of earnings components (e.g., persistence) is directly linked with the 
degree of their sophistication. If analysts make significant forecast errors in relation 
to the predicted persistence of accruals, their forecasts would be misleading with 
ultimate negative effects on market efficiency given the assumed reliance of 
investors on analysts, they would appear to lack sophistication which will have 
adverse effects on their reputation.  
Our empirical tests show no correlation between analysts’ forecast errors and 
revised total accruals (TACC). Findings are robust to different samples, periods, 
model specifications, decile ranked accruals, high accruals, absolute forecast errors, 
controlling for cash flows and high accounting conservatism. Our findings imply 
that if analysts are to achieve more accurate forecasts2, they should be considering 
                                                          
2 We assume analysts’ ultimate objective is to achieve minimum forecast error unless they are not 
strategically biased. Accuracy is one of key indicators of their performance (analysts who excel in 
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all rather than some accrual components. We interpret this evidence as an indication 
of analysts’ relative sophistication with respect to accruals. In such a context, our 
findings strongly indicate that if one is to test analysts' ability with respect to 
anticipating future earnings, all accrual components, i.e., the TACC as defined by 
Richardson et al. (2005) should be taken into account.  We show that using only 
one component of accruals may lead to misleading inferences regarding analysts' 
ability to predict accruals.  In contrasts to previous studies which use only WC 
accruals and find that analysts make significant errors in anticipating future 
earnings and accruals, we use TACC and find no evidence of analysts’ forecast 
errors.  Given that TACC is one of the main components of earnings in which WC 
accruals take a small portion, the correct understanding and anticipation of TACC 
will matter the most as far as the forecasts accuracy is concerned. Based on this 
notion, our findings point to the analysts’ high information processing abilities 
which is contrary to prior studies’ implications that analysts struggle to correctly 
anticipate accrual persistency. Moreover, our results imply that if analysts still 
exhibit errors in future earnings anticipations, this is then likely to be strategically 
motivated which calls for a future research focused on that particular area of 
analysts’ behaviour rather than building on the arguments that investors and 
analysts naively fixate on earnings and do not fully appreciate the low persistence 
of accruals. 
We also run forecast error (accuracy) regressions on individual accrual components 
by decomposing TACC into categories3. These tests reveal that analysts’ optimism 
with respect to WC accruals documented by previous research is in fact a result of 
a mechanical relation given the model’s specification, and that it does not indicate 
analysts’ lack of sophistication. If analysts correctly anticipate the persistence of 
accruals, forecast errors will not be correlated with TACC - which is what we find 
in the initial tests. However, any individual accrual component deviating from 
TACC’ persistence can correlate either optimistically or pessimistically with 
forecasts, depending on that particular component’s degree of persistence. Our 
                                                          
recommending and finding winning stocks with more accurate estimates are branded as ‘all-star’ 
analysts).  
3 Barth et al. (2016) provide evidence that each type of accrual has a different coefficient in 
forecasting future cash flows, forecasting earnings and in valuation. Each coefficient combines an 
information weight reflecting the information that accrual type provides and that partitioning 
accruals increases their ability to forecast future cash flows and earnings and to explain firm value. 
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findings are in line with this conjunction: forecast errors exhibit optimism with 
respect to less persistent WC accruals (which have 67% of persistence compared to 
the 73% persistence of total accruals)4, but pessimism with respect to highly 
persistent financial accruals (79% of persistence), while with respect to the non-
current operating accruals with a mid-range levels of persistence (at 74% level and 
closest to the total accruals’ persistence), no optimism or pessimism is observed. 
An alternative interpretation is that the negative (positive) coefficient5 on less 
(more) persistent accrual components in analyst forecast error regressions could be 
driven by analysts’ inability to incorporate different degrees of persistence across 
various earnings components. Indeed, if our arguments did not hold, i.e., if analysts 
could not distinguish between different persistence degrees across accrual 
components, and, say, assigned a random multiple to current earnings to forecast 
future earnings, then forecast errors would be either negatively or positively 
correlated with TACC across years, i.e., there would be a significant correlation 
between forecast error and TACC given that a randomly assigned multiple would 
not correctly predict future TACC consistently over years. What we observe instead 
is a consistent zero correlation between forecast errors and TACC across all forecast 
windows - ranging from the first to the last monthly forecast in every year of 
observation for the period 1976-2013, which confirms our argument that analysts 
indeed distinguish between different persistence degrees across accrual 
components. Our results also hold after we split the sample into two periods, 
relative to the before and after the application of the Sarbanes and Oxley Act6 (from 
1976 to 2002, and from 2003 to 2013, respectively). 
 
Our paper makes several contributions to the existing knowledge. First, our analysis 
contributes to the recent strand of literature indicating that market’s understanding 
of accruals has improved (Fedyk et al.  2018; Barth et al., 2016) by investigating 
                                                          
4 We also test the persistence degree of individual components as in Richardson et al. (2005), 
reported in the Appendix. These tests show that different components exhibit different persistence 
degrees with WC accruals being less persistent than financing accruals (67% vs. 79%), and that 
TACC reflect an average of its components’ persistence (73%). 
5 Negative (positive) coefficients in analysts’ forecast errors models are indicative of analysts’ 
optimism (pessimism). 
6 Cohen et al.  (2008) and  Chen and Huang (2013) show that after the Sarbanes and Oxley Act, 
accrual related earnings management activities has decreased, which could have contributed to 
analysts understanding of accruals after the Bradshaw et al., (2001) study. 
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whether and how analysts’ understanding of accruals properties and persistence in 
particular, has improved. While earlier studies, such as Bradshaw et al. (2001) show 
that analysts are optimistically biased with respect to WC accruals concluding that 
analysts lack the necessary sophistication in anticipating accruals’ persistence, we 
find that analysts’ forecast errors are uncorrelated with TACC, which indicates that 
prior conclusion with respect to accruals appears to be naïve and somewhat 
incomplete. Our findings imply that analysts seem to possess the necessary 
sophistication to understand accrual types and their relative persistence. In addition, 
our results show that analysts understand well the effect of conservative accounting 
on accruals’ persistence, which further points to their high sophistication.  
Second, we show that these earlier studies (Bradshaw et al. 2001) employ an 
incomplete accrual variable, the WC accruals in testing analysts’ forecast accuracy.  
In particular, by omitting non-current operating and financial accruals, analysts’ 
optimism may be a results of a mechanical relation given the models’ specification.  
With WC accruals being the least persistent accrual type associated with largest 
mispricing by investors (Richardson et al. 2005) it is not surprising that WC 
accruals are significantly associated with analysts’ forecasts errors. Our study 
modifies the definition of accruals by including non-current operating and financial 
accruals and finds no correlation between forecast errors and TACC. 
Finally, our findings do not support the argument that analysts’ long observed 
optimism in earnings forecasts may stem from accruals’ overestimation. Despite 
the fact that our sample shows optimistic earnings forecasts of analysts consistent 
with previous research, we find no correlation with such optimism and accruals. 
We recognize, however, that analysts’ correct anticipation of accruals’ persistence 
does not mean that their earnings forecasts are entirely free of bias. Analysts can 
make forecast errors for various reasons including strategic biases. For instance, our 
tests show pessimistic forecast errors with respect to cash flows, which is in line 
with similar findings in prior research (Drake and Myers, 2011). Hence, we suggest 
that future research should examine this correlation in greater depth as cash flows 
components have the highest level of persistence, and hence should be predicted 
most accurately. If analysts correctly anticipate accruals, which are less persistent 
than cash flows, but make significant errors in predicting cash flows, then this 
would suggest further investigation.  
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One of the major implications of this paper is that it does not warrant analysts’ lack 
of sophistication argument with respect to accruals’ persistence. Discriminating 
between lack of sophistication and high sophistication argument is important for 
both academics and practitioners as users of analysts’ reports. If analysts fail to 
accurately incorporate accrual information, the forecasts are biased, suboptimal and  
inefficient. If on the other hand, forecasts are efficient they contribute to market 
efficiency. Our findings support the latter. Hence, we suggest that future research 
focuses more on analysts’ incentives and model specification issues if forecasts are 
found to exhibit systematic biases as it is highly possible that systematic forecast 
errors may be consistent with analysts’ economic incentives. We acknowledge that 
the role and the reputation of analysts as surrogates of market expectations has been 
questioned in light of the Bradshaw et al.’s (2001) findings while at the same time 
the use of analysts’ reports by institutional investors and money managers in their 
decisions making process has been growing. Our findings help to resolve this 
tension by pointing to the analysts’ high information processing skills which to a 
certain extent justifies investors’ growing use of analyst reports. 
Another implication is that analysts seem to utilise all relevant accrual information 
in their forecasts, hence traditional accrual definition should be revised in future 
studies. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follow. The next section provides 
additional background and develops hypotheses. Section 3 describes the data, 
Section 4 explains research design and presents the results and Section 5 Section 6 
concludes.  
2. Theoretical background and hypotheses  
2.1. Background  
Prior evidence shows that earnings persist and mean reverse (gradually decline in 
time), i.e., Et+1=β Et+et+1 where 0<β<1, with accrual components in earnings mean 
reverse quicker than cash flows, Et+1=β(ACCt+CFt)+et+1 where 0<βACC<βCF<1, 
but that investors do not seem to anticipate such property of earnings. Firms with 
high accruals are likely to experience lower earnings in future, and investors who 
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buy firms with high accruals suffer from negative future returns (e.g., Sloan, 1996)7. 
This finding is important for analysts because they provide information to investors, 
and possibly affect their investment decisions.(Mendenhall, 1991). Therefore, a 
number of prior studies investigates how analysts incorporate accruals in their 
forecasts and find that they tend to be optimistic about WC accruals (e.g., Bradshaw 
et al. 2001; Thomas and Zhang, 2002; Collins et al. 2003; Hanlon, 2005; 
Mashruwala et al. 2006; Drake and Myers, 2011). This result is mainly interpreted 
as analysts’ failure to anticipate the subsequent earnings declines associated with 
high accruals consistent with the evidence in Sloan (1996). However, this 
interpretation is not in line with the inferences by the strand of the literature which 
suggests analysts’ superior ability over mechanical earnings generating models (see 
Brown and Rozeff, 1978; Fried and Givoly, 1982; Brown et al. 1987; Elgers and 
Murray, 1992) and analysts’ strategic behaviour in forecasting in that analysts’ 
optimism may be rational and originating in the loss functions underpinning their 
decisions (e.g., Gu and Wu, 2003; Basu and Markov, 2004)8. It is also important to 
note that prior studies on the relation between forecast accuracy and earnings 
components use WC in their forecast accuracy models assuming that accruals 
related to a number of special items (restructuring, impairments, equity method 
losses, etc.) are nonrecurring and investors are more likely to anticipate their nature 
themselves without relying on analysts information (e.g., Bradshaw et al. 2001). 
However, the evidence in Doyle et al. (2003) shows that such “special” accruals are 
far from nonrecurring, and firms with relatively large omissions of such items in 
their pro forma earnings experience lower returns. Richardson et al. (2005) further 
show that the traditional accrual definition based on WC excludes important 
accruals and results in noisy measures of accruals and cash flows which leads to 
significant mispricing9. In sum, these findings altogether offer a challenge to the 
                                                          
7 Coined as ‘Accrual Anomaly’, the phenomenon is explained by Sloan (1996) as investors’ fixation 
on reported earnings.  
8 Prior research finds that analysts issue optimistic forecasts to curry favour with managers in order 
to obtain better access to private information, to attract more investors and to boost investment 
banking fees (Francis and Philbrick 1993, Lin and McNichols, 1998;  Richardson et al.  2004; Cowen 
et al.  Groysberg, and Healy, 2006; Raedy et al. 2006). Analysts can also exhibit self-selection bias, 
i.e., they follow firms if they hold favourable views about them and censure negative views due to 
conflict of interest (see McNichols and O’Brien 1997; Michaely and Womack, 1999), which may 
lead to optimism on average. 
9 Richardson et al. (2005) show that security mispricing is driven by measurement errors, and 
noncurrent operating and financial accruals may also exhibit significant measurement errors. For 
instance, great subjectivity involves in the evaluation of noncurrent operating accruals. Changes in 
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lack of analysts’ sophistication argument and encourage us to revisit this issue by 
giving consideration to an accrual metric that covers all relevant information 
available to analysts.  
2.2. Hypotheses 
We argue that analysts’ optimism about WC accruals documented by prior research 
might not be due to their lack of sophistication but rather a result of an incomplete 
accrual information. Hence, we give consideration to TACC measure as proposed 
by Richardson et al. (2005) which includes non-current operating and financial 
accruals in addition to WC accruals. We assume that this broader measure provides 
more powerful tests of analysts’ sophistication regarding accruals as it covers all 
relevant accrual information available to analysts. If analysts lack the necessary 
sophistication to understand accruals’ persistence, earnings forecast errors should 
be correlated with this accrual measure that covers full accrual information. In that 
case, the association between forecast errors and TACC should be negative due to 
a quick mean reverting nature of accruals. Hence, our first hypothesis is as follows. 
H1: Analysts’ forecast errors are negatively correlated with total accruals. 
On the other hand, if analysts fully understand accruals’ persistence, there should 
be no association between the forecast errors and TACC. Then, as an alternative to 
H1, we should observe: 
H1A: Analysts’ forecasts errors are not correlated with total accruals 
Bradshaw et al. (2001) show that analysts are optimistically biased with respect to 
WC accruals, and this has led to a conclusion that analysts lack the necessary 
sophistication in anticipating accruals’ persistence. However, Richardson et al. 
(2005) show that accrual studies have so far omitted economically important 
accrual categories that are highly relevant for explaining future returns and 
                                                          
intangibles, capitalised interest expenses, write downs, depreciation, etc., may restrict investors 
anticipating future economic benefits related to these items. There is also error margin in the 
evaluation of financial accruals despite their assumed high reliability. There can be high transitions 
between operating and financing activities (e.g., an interest expense charged as an asset), estimation 
errors related to financial items/instruments, under/over statement of financial liabilities/assets, 
concealing unwise borrowing and investment decisions, etc. 
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earnings. Richardson et al. (2005) disaggregate TACC into components, and rate 
each accrual category according to its reliability determined by the degree of 
measurement error that the category is assumed to involve. They find that less 
reliable accruals result in lower earnings persistence, and that this leads to optimism 
in security pricing.10 They also find that TACC exhibit an average persistence 
degree of its components, while WC accruals show the lowest persistence, financial 
activity accruals show the highest persistence, and non-current operating accruals 
show the middle persistence of both11. Given that accruals persistence seems to be 
negatively related to optimism in security pricing, it is reasonable to expect that low 
persistency accruals are related with optimistic forecast errors, that high persistency 
accruals are associated with pessimistic forecast errors, while optimism/pessimism 
disappears with respect to accruals with medium persistence (TACC imply medium 
level of persistence since they include components across all persistence levels)12. 
In other words, the correlation between forecast errors (optimistic and pessimistic) 
and accruals will be (i) stronger for less and more persistent accrual components 
since their persistence significantly deviates from the TACC’ persistence, and (ii) 
weaker or insignificant for accrual components whose persistence is similar or 
closer to the TACC’ persistence. In other words, analysts’ optimism found in 
previous studies with respect to WC accruals is not due to their lack of 
sophistication, but rather due to the use of the individual accrual component 
generating this mechanical relation. We therefore hypothesise that:  
H2: Analysts’ forecast errors are optimistically (pessimistically) correlated 
with less (more) persistent accruals, while for the accruals with the mid-
level persistence, this correlation is insignificant. 
                                                          
10 Further studies confirm Richardson et al.’s findings (e.g., Das et al. 1998, Ke and Yu, 2006; 
Bradshaw et al. 2016). 
11 WC accruals are subject to more measurement errors - they contain subjective estimates like 
allowances for bad debts and inventory – whilst financial accruals are mainly measured with greater 
confidence. 
12 Note that analysts forecasts accuracy tests have forecast errors as dependent variable (where 
forecast error = forecasted earnings - actual earnings, and where earnings =  TACC + cash flows), 
and WC accruals as the key independent variable. The inclusion of WC accruals alone and 
omission of other accrual components may result in an incomplete model specification and a 
biased result.  
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3. Data and sample selection 
In the data selection process, we follow Bradshaw et al. (2001) and Richardson et 
al. (2005). We use non-financial US firms for the period between 1976 and 2013. 
Financial statement data is obtained from Compustat.  Analysts forecast data is from 
the IBES   and returns from CRSP. We use IBES EPS in our tests. Reported EPS is 
entered into IBES database on the same basis as analyst forecast by and large 
corresponding to earnings that represents core business as opposed to net income13. 
Hence, IBES EPS is considered to be the closest match with analyst forecast (see, 
Ramnath et al. 2008; Brown, 2007). However, we have also used Fully Reported 
GPS instead of Actual IBES EPS in the robustness tests14.  
Bradshaw et al. (2001) use decile ranked accruals focusing on high/low magnitude 
following Sloan (1996). Kraft et al. (2006) show that it may not be the accruals’ 
magnitude driving stock mispricing, and Xie (2001) shows that investors overprice 
mainly the portion of abnormal accruals stemming from managerial discretion 
adding measurement errors to accruals. Combining these findings with Richardson 
et al. (2005), who show that security mispricing is driven by persistence rather than 
magnitude15, we decide to use actual values in our tests. Since the persistence 
depends on measurement error, we consider it more appropriate to use actual 
values. We also perform tests with decile ranks of accrual portfolios. 
We use total accrual definition as in Richardson et al. (2005):  
TACC = ΔWC +ΔNCO + ΔFIN  (1) 
 where TACC is further decomposed into its underlying components16 
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 = ∆𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇 − ∆𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶���������
∆𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊
+ ∆𝑁𝑁𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇 − ∆𝑁𝑁𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶�������������
∆𝑁𝑁𝑊𝑊𝑁𝑁
+ ∆𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆 + ∆𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆 − ∆𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶���������������
∆𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑁𝑁
  (2) 
                                                          
14 In the Internet Appendix. 
14 In the Internet Appendix. 
15 High magnitude does not always translate into more forecast errors. On the contrary, low 
magnitude but low persistence (e.g., WC accrual) can cause greater forecast bias. 
16 All variables are defined in the Appendix. 
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We perform our tests across 12 months starting from the initial analysts’ forecasts, 
which are generally issued in the first month after the prior period earnings 
announcement. Our final sample contains 48,142 firm-year observations per month.  
3.1. Descriptive statistics and correlations 
Table 1 Panel A reports descriptive statistics for ROA, TACC, ΔWC, ΔNCO and 
ΔFIN based accruals. It also includes descriptive statistics for conservatism proxies, 
Hidden_reserves and C_Score. Mean TACC is 0.051 or roughly 5% of total assets. 
Means of ΔWC and ΔNCO are positive while mean ΔFIN is negative, which is 
indicative of an average firm increasing its non-current operations, and financing 
this increase by net debt17. Panel B reveals that all accrual components are positively 
correlated with ROA, with ΔWC having the highest correlation. The positive 
correlation between ΔWC and ΔNCO suggests that they grow together. Both ΔWC 
and ΔNCO are negatively correlated with ΔFIN, in line with the suggestion that 
growth in operating activities is largely financed by debt.  
Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics and pairwise correlations for the extended 
accrual decomposition. Panel A shows that mean values of all accrual components 
are positive with ΔNCOA having the highest mean while ΔLTI the lowest suggesting 
that NCOA constitute the major part of accruals. Standard deviations show that 
much of the variation in WC accruals is attributed to ΔCOA. Similar pattern is found 
with respect to ΔNCOA implying that the asset side of operating of accruals is more 
likely to be subject to measurement error. In contrast, much of the variation in ΔFIN 
can be attributable to ΔFINL. These observations suggest that the variation in 
operating accruals are driven by assets, while the variation in financial activity 
accruals are driven by liabilities. Panel B shows strong correlation among accrual 
components. In particular, the positive correlation between ΔCOA and ΔCOL 
suggests that a growing (shrinking) business generally results in an increase 
(decrease) in both current operating assets and liabilities. There is also a positive 
                                                          
17 The mean values reported in Table 1 Panel A are comparable to the corresponding mean values 
from Richardson et al. (2005). In particular, the mean TACC (ΔWC) in our paper is 0.051 (0.015) 
whilst it is 0.052 (0.022) in Richardson et al. (2005). We thank an anonymous reviewer for this 
point.  
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correlation between ΔCOA and ΔFINL suggesting that current operations are not 
only funded by operating liabilities, but also by financial debt. Moreover, ΔNCOA 
is positively correlated with all liability accruals18  
Table 3 reports negative means of forecast errors consistent with the prior evidence 
that analysts are optimistic on average. It also shows that mean errors (and standard 
deviations) are gradually disappearing as the earnings announcement date 
approaches.  (while initial earnings forecast error is 1.6% of the share price, the last 
month forecast error is only 0.3% of the price). This trend is expected, since the 
arrival of new information (e.g., quarterly earnings announcements) prompts 
analysts to revise their forecasts and forecast errors decrease.   
Table 4 Panels A and B show that forecast errors are not correlated with TACC, but 
optimistically (pessimistically) correlated with operating (financial) accruals. 
Similar pattern is observed for the extended accrual components providing an initial 
support to H1A and H2. 
 
 
4. Empirical Analysis 
4.1. Forecast error regressions on TACC  
To test H1 (H1A), we use forecast error model by Bradshaw et al. (2001) employing 
TACC and extend the model by breaking TACC into components. The regressions 
are run for 12 consecutive months and also incorporate cash flows (CF) following 
Drake and Myers (2011), who argue that accruals and cash flows are the primary 
components of earnings and that they are highly correlated.  
𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑠𝑠,𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖+1 = 𝛽𝛽0+𝛽𝛽1𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑇𝑇𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖+1   (3) 
                                                          
18 Note that the liability component of accruals is substracted from the asset component to arrive at 
net accruals. Hence, a positive relation between asset and liability implies they are likely to offset 
each other’s effects on net accruals. 
13 
  
While H1 requires a negative coefficient on TACC, the alternative hypothesis H1A 
requires insignificant coefficient on TACC.  
Table 5 Panels A and B (without and with cash flows) present the results for 
Equation (3). Both panels confirm H1A: analysts’ forecasts errors are not correlated 
with current TACC. The coefficients on TACC are statistically and economically 
zero across all 12 months.  .19 To address the possibility that our results may differ 
between periods before and after the implementation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
due to a lower accrual based earnings management in the post-SOX period (Chen 
and Huang, 2013) we split the sample period into two sub periods: from 1976 to 
2002 and from 2003 to 201320. The results (untabulated) confirm that the original 
results hold and that there is no difference between pre- and post-SOC years.  
4.2. Forecast error regressions on individual accrual components 
To test H2, we regress forecast errors on individual accrual components (as initial 
and extended accrual decomposition) by fitting the following models: 
𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑠𝑠,𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖+1 = 𝛽𝛽0+𝛽𝛽1∆𝑊𝑊𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2∆𝑁𝑁𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3∆𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽4𝑇𝑇𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖+1 (4) 
𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑠𝑠,𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖+1 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝛥𝛥𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2𝛥𝛥𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3𝛥𝛥𝑁𝑁𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽4𝛥𝛥𝑁𝑁𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  
+𝛽𝛽5𝛥𝛥𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽6𝛥𝛥𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖+𝛽𝛽7𝛥𝛥𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽8𝑇𝑇𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖+1 (5) 
 A negative (positive) sign on coefficients indicates forecast optimism 
(pessimism)21. Before running regressions (4) and (5), we also run persistence tests 
for individual accrual components following Richardson et al (2005). Reported in 
Appendix Panels A, B and C, tests show that CF has the highest persistent among 
earnings components with 80%, while ΔFIN with 79%, ΔNCO with 74%, TACC 
                                                          
19 Note that panel B shows pessimistic errors with CF, which has the highest persistence among 
earnings components and thus should be easier to predict relative to TACC. Bilinski (2014) shows 
that accuracy of CF estimates depends on the accuracy of accrual estimates, i.e., if analysts are 
accurate in estimating accruals, they should also be accurate in estimating CF. Hence, we avoid 
interpreting this observation as analysts’ lack of sophistication given that they seem to be accurate 
in predicting TACC. 
20 We thank an anonymous referee for this constructive suggestion.  
21 Analyst earnings forecasts have historically been optimistically biased leading to negative forecast 
errors on average (as calculated forecast minus actual). Hence, our tests are restricted to predicting 
a negative relation between less persistent accruals and forecast errors as in Bradshaw et al. (2001). 
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with 73%, and ΔWC with 67% which  confirms that different accrual components have 
different persistence characteristics, and TACC reflecting an average of its 
components’ persistence.  
If the H2 holds, then analysts’ forecast errors will be optimistically (pessimistically) 
correlated with low (high) persistent accruals, while for the accruals with the middle 
persistence levels, the correlation is insignificant, H222. If the lack of sophistication 
argument holds, the correlation between forecast errors and accruals becomes 
stronger (weaker) as the persistence of an accrual component decreases (increases), 
i.e., β1ΔWC<β2ΔNCO<β3ΔFIN<0). We acknowledge that the confirmation of H2 will 
only support the argument that analysts fully understand accruals’ persistence if 
also H1A holds, i.e., if there is no correlation between forecast errors and TACC.  
Table 6 reports the results for Equations (4) and (5) in Panels A and B. Confirming 
H2, both panels show that forecast errors are optimistically correlated with low 
persistence accruals, but pessimistically correlated with high persistence accruals 
across the 12 months, while the accruals of the medium persistence do not show 
any association with errors (e.g., β1ΔWC=-0.039, β2ΔNCO=0, β3ΔFIN >=0.017 for month 
1). Moreover, the coefficient magnitudes in Panels A and B of Table 6 line up 
closely with the relative persistence rankings reported in the Appendix A Panels B 
and C (e.g., persistence degrees respectively are ΔCOL=62.9% (0.803-0.177), 
ΔCOA=66.8%, ΔNCOL=70.6%, ΔNCOA=72.6%, ΔLTI=74.4%, ΔFINL=75.1%, 
and ΔSTI=76.9%, and their coefficients in forecast errors tests are ΔCOL=-0.062, 
ΔCOA=-0.037, ΔNCOL=-0.031, ΔNCOA=-0.002, ΔLTI=0.006, ΔFINL=0.024, and 
ΔSTI=0.010. F-tests confirm that the coefficients are different from each other. 
In sum, both tests reported in Tables 5 and 6 confirm H1A and H2. The correlation 
between forecast errors and accruals becomes stronger (weaker) as the persistence 
of an accrual component decreases (increases), and forecast errors are optimistically 
(pessimistically) correlated with low (high) persistent accruals, while for the 
accruals with medium persistence the correlation is insignificant. We interpret these 
findings as analysts correctly anticipating accruals’ persistence. We perform a bank 
of additional sensitivity analyses (reported in Internet Appendix) which confirm 
that our results are robust to different samples, periods, model specifications, 
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absolute forecast errors, and to controlling for cash flows and high accounting 
conservatism.  
6. Conclusion  
Prior evidence documents that analysts who provide information to investors fail to 
fully understand accruals’ varying persistence levels and as result produce 
optimistic forecasts of earnings for firms with relatively high WC accruals 
(Bradshaw, Richardson, and Sloan, 2001).  However, growing evidence suggests 
that the traditional accrual definition used in the empirical models of forecast 
accuracy omits economically important accruals that are highly relevant for 
explaining future earnings and returns. 
In this paper, we argue that analysts are likely to use this important accrual 
information and that empirical models measuring accruals by means of WC alone 
may be incomplete and hence not entirely appropriate and up-to-date to assess the 
level of analysts’ appreciation of accruals. We suggest that that analysts’ optimism 
found in Bradshaw et al. (2001) may not be due to their lack of sophistication, but 
rather a result of an incomplete accrual information embedded in forecast accuracy 
tests. We address this issue and give consideration to non-current operating and 
financial accruals in forecasting models.  We find no correlation between analysts’ 
forecast errors and revised TACC. Our findings imply that if analysts are to achieve 
more accurate forecasts, they should be considering all rather than some accrual 
components. We believe that our study provides useful implication for future 
research by documenting that analysts appear to utilise all relevant accrual 
information in their forecasts and traditional accrual definition should be modified 
in future accrual studies. 
Our findings have potentially important implications for both academics and 
practitioners as users of analysts’ reports in that that it rules out the lack of analysts’ 
sophistication argument. This is important because if analysts fail to accurately 
incorporate accrual information, the forecasts are biased and inefficient. Our results 
support the opposite and imply analysts’ high information processing skills which 
helps to explain a trend in the growing use of analysts’ reports by investors.   
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Appendix 
Variable definitions 
Ferror Ferrors,t+1 =[Actual EPSt+1–Forecast EPSs,t+1]/Pt Analysts’ 
earnings forecast errors computed as actual IBES EPS for year t+1 
minus analysts’ consensus (median) forecast EPS from IBES in 
month s (s=1, 2, 3, ….12) scaled by price from CRSP in the first 
month that year t earnings is announced.  
 
ROA Earnings. Operating income after depreciation  deflated by average 
assets  
 
TACC Total accruals is the change in non-cash assets - change in liabilities 
deflated by average assets  
 
CF Cash flows  from operating activities deflated by average assets. 
 
ΔOPAC Operating accruals: change in non-cash working capital (ΔWCt) plus 
change in net non-current operating assets (ΔNCOt), deflated by 
average assets. 
 
ΔWC Working capital accruals is the change in net working capital = WCt 
- WCt-1. WC is current operating assets (COA) less operating 
liabilities (COL). COA=current assets - cash and short term 
investments, and COL=current liabilities - short term debt.  
 
ΔNCO Non-current operating accruals is the change in net non-current 
operating assets = NCOt - NCOt-1. NCO is = non-current operating 
assets (NCOA) - non-current op.liabilities (NCOL). NCOA=total 
assets - current assets  - investments and advances , and NCOL=total 
liability - current liabilities - short term debt  - long term debt  
 
ΔFIN Financing accruals is the change in net financial assets = FINt -FINt-
1. FIN=financial assets (FINA) - financial liabilities (FINL). 
FINA=short term investments (STI) + long term investments (LTI) 
(Compustat Item IVAO, #32). FINL= long term debt + short term 
debt + preferred stock  
 
Returns Size adjusted returns are calculated as the sum of 12-month buy and 
hold stock returns from CRSP (accumulation starts in the fourth 
month after the fiscal year end) minus the corresponding value-
weighted average returns for all firms in the same size-matched 
decile. To form size deciles, market values are ranked annually, and 
assigned in equal numbers to ten portfolios. 
 
E/P Earnings to price ratio calculated as operating income after 
depreciation at time t deflated by market value at time t-1. 
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Size Natural log of market value of equity.  Market value is calculated 
as the share price multiplied by common shares outstanding  
 
B/P Book value of equity divided by market value of equity.  Book value 
of equity = Common ordinary equity + Preferred treasury stock 
Current Assets  + Preferred dividends in arrears  
 
Beta Estimated 60 month rolling regressions using the market model  
  �𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − 𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓� = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖�𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖 − 𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓� + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  
Ret is the CRSP monthly buy and hold returns for 12 month for stock 
i at time t, 𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓 is risk the free rate, (𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖 − 𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓) is the equity risk 
premium of the market portfolio. Rf is obtained from the US Federal 
Reserve, H15 report as the 10-year US Treasury bond rate for the 
relevant year. Retmt is the CRSP monthly value weighted return on a 
market portfolio cumulated over 12 months. 
 
C_Score Firm specific conditional conservatism proxy varying across years 
developed using the following Khan and Watts (2009) model based 
on Basu (1997) asymmetric timelines of earnings measure; 
𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽1 + 𝛽𝛽2𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 �𝜇𝜇1 + 𝜇𝜇2𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 + 𝜇𝜇3 𝑀𝑀𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖 + 𝜇𝜇4𝑙𝑙𝐹𝐹𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖� + 
𝛽𝛽4𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 �𝛾𝛾1 + 𝛾𝛾2𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾3 𝑀𝑀𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾4𝑙𝑙𝐹𝐹𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖� + 𝛿𝛿1𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖+𝛿𝛿2 𝑀𝑀𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖 +                        𝛿𝛿3𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿4𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿5𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 𝑀𝑀𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿6𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖 + 𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
The parameters are estimated annually, C_Score is calculated as 
𝑇𝑇_𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ≡ 𝛽𝛽4 = 𝛾𝛾1 + 𝛾𝛾2𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾3 𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖� + 𝛾𝛾4𝑙𝑙𝐹𝐹𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
Where X is earnings before extraordinary items deflated by market 
value (MV) at time t-1, MV is calculated as the share price 
multiplied by common shares outstanding. R denotes annual buy and 
hold return inclusive of dividends and other distributions, 
accumulation period starts in the fourth month after the fiscal year 
end t-1 and continues for the next 12 months. D is set to 1 if R<0 
and zero otherwise. The coefficient 𝛽𝛽4 measures the incremental 
timeliness for bad news over good news, or conservatism. E/P is 
income at time t deflated by market value at time t-1. Size is the 
natural log of market value at time t, leverage is measured as long 
term debt plus short term debt divided by the market value at time t. 
M/B is calculated as market value at time t divided by the book value 
of equity at time t. All firm years with missing data, negative total 
assets and book values are eliminated in estimation. Firms with share 
price less than $1 are eliminated 
 
Hid_Res  Hidden reserves to proxy unconditional accounting conservatism by 
Penman and Zhang, (2002; 2016) deflated by average assets 
𝐻𝐻𝑆𝑆𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐹𝐹𝐻𝐻_𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑙𝑙𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 = 𝑅𝑅&𝐷𝐷𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖  + 𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 + 𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖   
R&Dres is unamortised balance of R&D expenditures that would 
have appeared on balance sheet if it had been capitalised and 
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amortised at a straightline rate of 20%, assuming a uniform 
distribution. 
𝑅𝑅&𝐷𝐷𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 0.9𝑅𝑅&𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 0.7𝑅𝑅&𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 + 0.5𝑅𝑅&𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−2+ 0.3𝑅𝑅&𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−3 + 0.1𝑅𝑅&𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−4 
ADVres is advertisement reserve calculated using advertisement 
expenditures assuming a useful life of two years, and providing more 
benefits when first initiated   
𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 1/3𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 
LIFOres is LIFO reserves reported in the inventory footnotes in 
financial reports.  
 
PANEL A: Persistence of accruals (-TACC)  
 
PANEL B: Persistence of accruals (initial decomposition) 
 
PANEL B: Persistence of accruals (extended decomposition) 
intercept R 2
mean coef. 0.008 0.797 *** -0.068 *** 0.632
t-stat 99.11 -16.15
ROA TACC
intercept ROA R 2
mean coef. 0.007 0.791 *** -0.122 *** 0.631
pvalue -16.09
mean coef. 0.008 0.782 *** -0.051 *** 0.625
t-stat -10.79
mean coef. 0.005 0.777 *** 0.002 0.629
t-stat 0.26
mean coef. 0.009 0.804 *** -0.137 *** -0.065 *** -0.045 *** 0.634
t-stat -19.59 -12.32 -11.78
Persistence order highest low medium high
ΔWC ΔNCO ΔFIN
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intercept R 2
Predicted reliability a
mean coef. 0.005 0.776 *** -0.035 *** 0.62
t-stat -4.03
mean coef. 0.008 0.786 *** -0.065 *** 0.63
t-stat -11.3
mean coef. 0.005 0.777 *** -0.044 *** 0.62
t-stat -4.52
mean coef. 0.007 0.782 *** -0.047 *** 0.62
t-stat -10.17
mean coef. 0.006 0.78 *** -0.037 *** 0.63
t-stat -4.45
mean coef. 0.005 0.776 *** 0.010 *** 0.62
t-stat 2.00
mean coef. 0.006 0.775 *** -0.026 *** 0.62
t-stat -5.53
mean coef. 0.008 0.803 *** -0.177 *** -0.132 *** -0.097 *** -0.077 *** -0.059 *** -0.052 *** -0.034 *** 0.63
t-stat -18.40 -19.11 -8.38 -14.21 -6.65 -9.46 -6.77
Persistence Order 8 Highest 1 Low 2 3 4 5 6 7  high
ROA (-)ΔCOL ΔCOA (-)ΔNCOL ΔNCOA ΔLTI (-)ΔFINL ΔSTI
High High
ROA t+1 denotes earnings and ROA t denotes cash flows by the model construction. Other variables represent accrual components of
earnings. See Appendix for models ROA (1), (2) and (3). Standard errors are clustered by firm and year using the Petersen (2009)
approach. The sample consists of 142,821 firm-year observations for 1976-2013, all earnings and accrual variables are deflated by
average assets and winsorised to +1 and -1.  See Appendix for variable definitions.  *** denotes the statistical significance at 1% level
High Low Medium Low Medium
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          Table 1 
          Descriptive statistics and correlations for ROA, accruals, conservatism 
 
PANEL A: Descriptive statistics 
mean std.dev. 25% median 75%
ROA t+1 0.045 0.214 0.007 0.08 0.14
ROA t 0.043 0.186 0.002 0.076 0.136
TACC t 0.051 0.195 -0.021 0.037 0.109
ΔOPAC t 0.063 0.195 -0.027 0.041 0.135
ΔFIN t -0.012 0.176 -0.071 -0.002 0.048
ΔWC t 0.015 0.106 -0.024 0.008 0.052
ΔNCO t 0.048 0.159 -0.015 0.021 0.084
C_Score t 0.013 0.115 -0.052 0.012 0.081
Hidden_Reserves t 0.163 0.190 0.035 0.098 0.218
PANEL B: Correlation matrix—Pearson (above diagonal) and Spearman (below diagonal) 
ROA t+1 - 0.75 *** 0.13 *** 0.09 *** 0.05 *** 0.01 *** 0.04 *** -0.24 *** -0.16 ***
ROA t 0.79 *** - 0.22 *** 0.18 *** 0.05 *** 0.20 *** 0.08 *** -0.27 *** -0.17 ***
TACC t 0.23 *** 0.38 *** - 0.69 *** 0.45 *** 0.40 *** 0.47 *** -0.10 *** -0.02 ***
ΔOPAC t 0.13 *** 0.27 *** 0.60 *** - -0.45 *** 0.60 *** 0.84 *** -0.08 *** -0.06 ***
ΔFIN t 0.09 *** 0.08 *** 0.29 *** -0.47 *** - -0.22 *** -0.41 *** -0.02 *** 0.04 ***
ΔWC t 0.12 *** 0.23 *** 0.41 *** 0.63 *** -0.27 *** - 0.07 *** -0.01 *** -0.02 ***
ΔNCO t 0.11 *** 0.22 *** 0.47 *** 0.80 *** 0.41 *** 0.16 *** - -0.12 -0.07 ***
C_Score t -0.02 *** -0.02 *** -0.08 *** -0.06 *** -0.01 *** -0.01 *** -0.06 - 0.05
H_Rt -0.39 *** -0.43 *** -0.05 *** -0.08 *** 0.03 *** -0.05 *** -0.07 *** 0.00 -
Earmings/accruals sample consists of 142,821 firm-year observations, while Hidden_Reserves (H_R) and C_Score (C_S) samples
consist of 98,196 and 96,324 firm-year observations respectively for 1976-2013. All earnings and accrual variables are deflated by
average assets and winsorised to +1 and -1, while C_Score and Hidden_Reserves are winsorised to %1 and %99. See Appendix for
variable definitions.  *** denotes the statistical significance at 1% level
ROA t+1 ROA t TACC t ΔOPAC t ΔFIN t ΔWC t ΔNCO t C_S t H_R t
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          Table 2 
          Descriptive statistics and correlations for extended accrual decomposition 
  
PANEL A: Descriptive statistics 
mean std.dev. 25% median 75%
ΔCOA t 0.040 0.132 -0.01 0.022 0.081
ΔCOL t 0.025 0.09 -0.009 0.015 0.051
ΔNCOA t 0.055 0.163 -0.012 0.025 0.091
ΔNCOL t 0.006 0.049 -0.001 0.001 0.011
ΔSTI t 0.007 0.105 0 0 0
ΔLTI t 0.002 0.047 0 0 0
ΔFINL t 0.021 0.141 -0.023 0 0.051
PANEL B: Correlation matrix—Pearson (above diagonal) and Spearman (below diagonal) 
ROA t+1 - 0.75 *** 0.11 *** 0.04 *** 0.05 *** 0.02 *** 0.03 *** 0.02 *** -0.03***
ROA t 0.79 *** - 0.16 *** 0.00 0.09 *** 0.01 *** 0.04 *** 0.02 *** -0.02 ***
ΔCOA t 0.20 *** 0.31 *** - 0.60 *** 0.29 *** 0.08 *** 0.01 0.01 *** 0.33 ***
ΔCOL t 0.15 *** 0.18 *** 0.57 *** - 0.31 *** 0.07 *** 0.09 *** 0.03 *** 0.20 ***
ΔNCOA t 0.14 *** 0.25 *** 0.38 *** 0.35 *** - 0.23 *** -0.01 -0.01 *** 0.51 ***
ΔNCOL t 0.15 *** 0.19 *** 0.14 *** 0.11 *** 0.31 *** - 0.01 *** 0.06 *** 0.03 ***
ΔSTI t 0.07 *** 0.09 *** -0.02 *** 0.08 *** -0.02 *** 0.02 *** - -0.02 *** 0.03 ***
ΔLTI t 0.02 *** 0.04 *** 0.03 *** 0.04 *** 0.02 *** 0.06 *** 0.00 - 0.08 ***
ΔFINL t -0.04 *** -0.04 0.32 *** 0.17 *** 0.05 *** 0.11 *** -0.02 *** 0.05 *** -
The sample consists of 142,821 firm-year observations for 1976-2013. Variables are deflated by average assets and
winsorised to +1 and -1.  See Appendix for variable definitions.  *** denotes the statistical significance at 1% level 
ROA t+1 ROA t ΔCOA t ΔCOL t ΔNCOA t ΔNCOL t ΔSTI t ΔLTI t ΔFINL t
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Table 3 
Descriptive statistics for earnings forecast errors 
 
  
mean std.dev. 25% median 75%
M1Ferror -0.016 0.049 -0.020 -0.002 0.003
M2Ferror -0.015 0.048 -0.018 -0.002 0.003
M3Ferror -0.013 0.056 -0.016 -0.001 0.003
M4Ferror -0.012 0.055 -0.014 -0.001 0.003
M5Ferror -0.011 0.054 -0.013 -0.001 0.003
M6Ferror -0.009 0.038 -0.010 -0.001 0.003
M7Ferror -0.008 0.039 -0.008 0.000 0.002
M8Ferror -0.007 0.037 -0.007 0.000 0.002
M9Ferror -0.005 0.038 -0.005 0.000 0.002
M10Ferror -0.004 0.040 -0.003 0.000 0.002
M11Ferror -0.004 0.040 -0.002 0.000 0.002
M12Ferror -0.003 0.033 -0.002 0.000 0.002
m1, m2, ...m12 denote months, Ferror denotes analysts' earnings forecast error. The
number of firm-year observations are 48,142 across 12 months for 1976-2013.  See appendix 
for variable definitions.
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Table 4 
Correlations between analysts forecast errors, accruals and conservatism 
across 12 months 
 
 
PANEL A: Pearson correlations: intial accrual decomposition and average forecast errors
M1Ferror t+1 0.01 -0.06 *** 0.07 *** -0.07 *** -0.03 *** -0.11 *** 0.00
M2Ferror t+1 0.00 -0.06 *** 0.07 *** 0.07 *** -0.04 *** -0.09 *** 0.01
M3Ferror t+1 0.00 -0.05 *** 0.05 *** -0.05 *** -0.03 *** -0.09 *** 0.02
M4Ferror t+1 0.00 -0.05 *** 0.05 *** -0.05 *** -0.03 *** -0.09 *** 0.02 ***
M5Ferror t+1 0.00 -0.05 *** 0.05 *** -0.04 *** -0.03 *** -0.08 *** 0.03 ***
M6Ferror t+1 0.00 -0.06 *** 0.06 *** -0.06 *** -0.03 *** -0.08 *** 0.03 ***
M7Ferror t+1 0.00 -0.06 *** 0.05 *** -0.05 *** -0.04 *** -0.08 *** 0.03 ***
M8Ferror t+1 0 -0.05 *** 0.05 *** -0.05 *** -0.03 *** -0.06 *** 0.03 ***
M9Ferror t+1 0.01 -0.04 *** 0.05 *** -0.04 *** -0.02 *** -0.06 *** 0.03 ***
M10Ferror t+1 0 -0.04 *** 0.04 *** -0.03 *** -0.03 *** -0.05 *** 0.02 ***
M11Ferror t+1 0 -0.04 *** 0.04 *** -0.03 *** -0.03 *** -0.05 *** 0.03 ***
M12Ferror t+1 0.00 -0.03 *** 0.03 *** -0.03 *** -0.02 *** -0.05 *** 0.02 ***
PANEL B: Pearson correlations: extended accrual decomposition and average forecast errors
M1Ferror t+1 -0.04 *** -0.03 *** -0.03 *** -0.02 *** 0.03 *** 0.01 0.07 ***
M2Ferror t+1 -0.04 *** -0.03 *** -0.03 *** -0.03 *** 0.03 *** 0.01 0.07 ***
M3Ferror t+1 -0.03 *** -0.01 *** -0.03 *** -0.01 *** 0.02 *** 0.01 0.05 ***
M4Ferror t+1 -0.03 *** -0.01 *** -0.03 *** -0.03 *** -0.02 *** 0.01 0.05 ***
M5Ferror t+1 -0.03 *** -0.01 *** -0.02 *** -0.03 *** -0.02 *** 0.00 0.05 ***
M6Ferror t+1 -0.04 *** -0.01 *** -0.03 *** -0.02 *** -0.02 *** 0.00 0.06 ***
M7Ferror t+1 -0.03 *** -0.02 *** -0.02 *** -0.05 *** 0.02 *** 0.01 0.05 ***
M8Ferror t+1 -0.03 *** -0.02 *** -0.02 *** -0.05 *** 0.02 *** 0.00 0.05 ***
M9Ferror t+1 -0.03 *** -0.01 -0.02 *** -0.02 *** 0.02 *** 0.01 0.04 ***
M10Ferror t+1 -0.02 *** -0.01 *** -0.01 *** -0.05 *** 0.02 *** 0.01 0.04 ***
M11Ferror t+1 -0.01 *** -0.02 *** -0.01 *** -0.05 *** 0.02 *** 0.00 0.03 ***
M12Ferror t+1 -0.01 *** -0.02 *** -0.01 -0.04 *** 0.01 *** 0.00 0.03 ***
TACC t ΔOPAC t ΔFIN t ΔWC t ΔNCO t C_Score t H_Reserv t
ΔCOA t
m1, m2, ...m12 denote months, Ferror denotes analysts' earnings forecast error. The number of firm-
year observations are 48,142 across 12 months for 1976-2013 for which consensus analsyt earning
forecasts and actual earnings are available on the IBES summary file. Accrual variables are winsorised
to +1 and -1, while forecast errors are winsorised to 1% and 99%. See Appendix fr variable defnition.
*** denotes the statistical significance at 1% level
ΔLTI tΔSTI tΔNCOL tΔNCOA tΔCOL t ΔFINL t
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Table 5 
Regressions for forecast errors on TACC and cash flows over 12 months 
  
PANEL A: Forecast errors and total accruals 
Month m1 m2 m3 m4 m5 m6 m7 m8 m9 m10 m11 m12
Intercept (coef.) -0.017 ***-0.015 ***-0.013 ***-0.012 *** -0.01 ***-0.009 ***-0.008 ***-0.007 ***-0.005 ***-0.004 ***-0.003 ***-0.003 ***
TACC (coef.) 0.002 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.001 0 0 0
t-stat 0.94 0.39 -0.05 -0.1 -0.22 0.15 -0.07 0.08 0.67 0.15 0.15 0.2
PANEL B: Forecast errors, total accruals and cash flows
Month m1 m2 m3 m4 m5 m6 m7 m8 m9 m10 m11 m12
Intercept (coef.) -0.018 ***-0.016 ***-0.013 ***-0.013 ***-0.011 ***-0.009 ***-0.008 ***-0.007 ***-0.005 ***-0.004 ***-0.004 ***-0.003 ***
TACC (coef.) 0 -0.002 -0.03 0.003 -0.003 0.002 -0.002 -0.002 0 -0/001 0 0
t-stat 0.19 0.72 -1.17 -0.88 -0.90 -0.71 -0.70 -0.48 0.67 -0.42 -0.32 -0.35
CF(coef.) 0.043 *** 0.037 *** 0.032 *** 0.029 0.026 *** 0.022 *** 0.021 *** 0.017 *** 0.014 *** 0.013 *** 0.012 *** 0.11 ***
t-stat 8.85 8.75 7.45 8.05 8.00 6.97 7.41 6.92 6.46 6.43 6.30 6
%R 2 1.63 1.27 0.65 0.53 0.45 0.72 0.59 0.43 0.27 0.19 0.17 0.22
m1, m2, ...m12 denote months, Ferror denotes analysts' earnings forecast error. The number of firm-year observations are 48,142 from 1976 to 2013
for which consensus analsyt earning forecasts and actual earnings are available on the IBES summary statistics file. Standard errors are clustered by firm and 
year using the Petersen (2009) approach.  See Appendix for variable definitions.  *** denotes the statistical significance at 1% level
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Table 6 
Forecast errors and accrual components over 12 months 
 
 
 
  
PANEL A: Forecast errors and accruals (initial accrual decomposition) 
m1 m2 m3 m4 m5 m6 m7 m8 m9 m10 m11 m12
Intercept (coef.) -0.015 *** -0.014 *** -0.12 *** -0.011 *** -0.01 *** -0.008 *** -0.007 *** -0.006 *** -0.005 *** -0.004 *** -0.003 *** -0.003 ***
Persistence Order (d)
ΔWC (coef.) 1 Low -0.039 *** -0.038 *** -0.033 *** -0.027 *** -0.025 *** -0.026 *** -0.023 *** -0.019 *** -0.015 *** -0.013 *** -0.011 *** -0.010 ***
t-stat -8.63 -8.85 -5.98 -6.19 -6.27 -9.12 -8.52 -7.11 -6.73 -5.25 -3.82 -4.46
ΔNCO (coef. 2 -0.001 -0.003 -0.005 -0.007 -0.007 -0.003 -0.005 -0.004 -0.001 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003
t-stat -0.33 -1.00 -1.22 -1.06 -1.13 -0.99 -0.97 -0.78 -0.47 -0.86 -0.81 -0.74
ΔFIN (coef.) 3 0.017 *** 0.015 *** 0.012 *** 0.011 *** 0.01 *** 0.01 *** 0.009 *** 0.008 *** 0.007 *** 0.005 *** 0.005 *** 0.005 ***
t-stat 5.46 5.03 4.38 3.82 3.76 4.15 3.84 3.96 4.27 4.00 3.56 3.88
CF (coef.) 4 High 0.042 *** 0.035 *** 0.030 *** 0.027 *** 0.025 *** 0.021 *** 0.020 *** 0.016 *** 0.013 *** 0.012 *** 0.011 *** 0.010 ***
t-stat 8.58 8.57 7.10 7.70 7.77 6.85 7.48 6.99 6.39 6.63 6.58 6.29
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PANEL B: Forecast errors and accruals (extended accrual decomposition) 
m1 m2 m3 m4 m5 m6 m7 m8 m9 m10 m11 m12
Intercept (coef.) -0.016 *** -0.014 *** 0.012 *** -0.011 *** 0.010 *** -0.009 *** -0.008 *** -0.008 *** -0.005 *** -0.004 *** -0.004 *** -0.003 ***
Persistence Order
(-)ΔCOL (coe 1 Low -0.062 *** -0.034 *** -0.030 *** -0.024 *** -0.023 *** -0.024 *** -0.021 *** -0.017 *** -0.013 *** -0.011 *** -0.009 *** -0.008 ***
t-stat -7.26 -7.44 -5.47 -5.47 -5.56 -7.85 -7.37 -6.39 -6.04 -4.87 -3.58 -4.03
ΔCOA (coef. 2 -0.037 *** -0.034 *** -0.030 *** -0.024 *** -0.023 *** -0.024 *** -0.021 *** -0.017 *** -0.013 *** -0.011 *** -0.009 *** -0.008 ***
t-stat -7.26 -7.44 -5.47 -5.47 -5.56 -7.85 -7.37 -6.39 -6.04 -4.87 -3.58 -4.03
(-)ΔNCOL (c 3 -0.031 *** -0.038 *** -0.031 *** -0.036 *** -0.025 ** -0.027 *** -0.006 -0.005 -0.009 *** -0.005 -0.004 -0.004
t-stat -4.02 -3.21 -3.78 -2.27 -1.96 -3.94 -1.59 -1.57 -2.97 -1.32 -1.28 -1.19
ΔNCOA (coef 4 -0.002 -0.004 -0.005 -0.006 -0.006 -0.002 -0.004 -0.003 0 -0.003 -0.003 -0.002
t-stat -0.71 -1.22 -1.32 -1.03 -0.99 -0.69 -0.79 -0.66 -0.11 -0.69 -0.73 -0.62
ΔLTI (coef.) 5 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.005 0.004 0.003 0.001 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001
t-stat 1.33 1.21 1.13 1.17 0.92 0.91 0.88 0.33 1.01 0.96 0.56 0.48
(-)ΔFINL (co 6 0.024 *** 0.022 *** 0.019 *** 0.017 *** 0.016 *** 0.015 *** 0.012 *** 0.012 *** 0.009 *** 0.009 *** 0.008 *** 0.007 ***
t-stat 5.95 5.65 4.68 4.69 4.94 4.74 4,98 4.75 3.89 4.26 3.85 3.91
ΔSTI (coef.) 7 0.010 *** 0.008 *** 0.007 *** 0.007 *** 0.006 *** 0.006 *** 0.006 *** 0.006 *** 0.006 *** 0.004 *** 0.004 *** 0.004 ***
t-stat 4.23 3.59 3.15 2.32 2.37 2.75 2.87 3.51 4.21 3.47 2.92 3.45
CF (coef.) 8 High 0.041 *** 0.035 *** 0.030 *** 0.029 *** 0.024 *** 0.020 *** 0.020 *** 0.016 *** 0.012 *** 0.011 *** 0.010 *** 0.010 ***
t-stat 8.71 8.65 7.15 7.67 7.79 6.84 7.21 6.82 5.60 6.68 6.54 5.92
m1, m2, ...m12 denote months, Ferror denotes analysts' earnings forecast error. Persistence order of earnings components is obtained from the multivariate persistence
regressions provided in Appendix(Panels A-C). The number of firm-year observations are 48,142 for 1976-2013 for which consensus analsyt earning forecasts and
actual earnings are available on IBES summary statistics file. Standard errors are clustered by firm and year using Petersen (2009). Untabulated F-tests reveal that
coefficients are different from  each other in the first 3-4 months.  See Appendix for variable definitions.  *** denotes the statistical significance at 1% level
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